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urn:uuid:76ca6d0b-6539-484b-a2a7-d872e064fdae 03 15 9781805114604 00 EB E107 10 01 01 No Prices No Games! Four Economic Models 1 A01 Michael Richter Michael Richter is a professor of Economics at Baruch College, City University of New York and Royal Holloway, University of London. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago (BS, Math) and New York University (PhD, Economics). His research interests are in microeconomic theory, particularly decision theory, general equilibrium, and search. He lives in New York, with his wife and two kids. For other works, the author’s website is: http://www.mrichter.co/ 2 A01 Ariel Rubinstein Ariel Rubinstein was born in Jerusalem and received his PhD from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1979. Has been a Professor at the Hebrew University and at Princeton and currently is a Professor (Emeritus) at Tel Aviv University and a Professor of Economics at New York University. He has served as the President of the Econometric Society (2004). He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Economic Association, an Elected Fellow of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. His 7 books reflect his research interests: Bargaining and Markets (with M. Osborne) (1990), A Course in Game Theory (with M. Osborne) (1994), Modeling Bounded Rationality (1998), Economics and Language (2000), Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (2005) and Models of Microeconomic Theory (with M.Osborne) (2020). His book Economic Fables (2012) presents his general views about Economic Theory. He created and manages the Atlas of Cafes (where one can think). All his books and articles are accessed through his homepage https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il. 01 eng 00 154 03 10 BUS069030 23 Economics 23 Economic Theory 04 HB135 10 BUS024000 23 Models 23 Textbooks and Learning Guides 10 BUS069040 23 Prices 23 Games 23 Agents 23 Equilibrium 01 06 03 00 While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.• Systematic biases in agents' preferences.These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games. 04 00 Personal Note Notation and Terminology 0. Introduction 1. Equilibrium in the Jungle 2. The Permissible and the Forbidden 3. Status and Indoctrination 4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium 5. A Comparison to Game Theory References Open Book Publishers 01 Open Book Publishers 04 01 20241113 02 WORLD 06 15 9781805114581 06 15 9781805114598 06 15 9781805114604 WORLD 09 Open Book Publishers 20 01