Thoth distribution@thoth.pub Google 20260401T130443

urn:uuid:ae782b7e-8681-4368-b393-88eb7ba231a9 03 15 9781928502876 00 EB E107 10 01 01 State Power in Land Reform Barriers to implementation in the Western and Northern Cape, South Africa, 1990–2006 1 A01 Thorvald Gran 00 156 03 10 SOC008010 01 06 04 00 List of tables List of figures Works on land reform previously published by the author Foreword 1 Introduction 1.1 Problem and research question 1.2 Searle’s (2001) theory of rationality: Disjunctions and reflection rooms 1.3 Mamdani’s (1996) theory of communal land and political power 1.4 Seligman (1997): Trust assigns freedom and authority to another 1.5 The Hupe (2011) theory of incongruent implementation 1.6 Norman Long (1989, 2001) on disjunctions between persons, institutions and systems 1.7 Fields of study, selected institutions 1.8 The empirical investigations 1.9 World Bank economists Binswanger and Deininger (1996) on organization in agriculture 1.10 Farms: The national picture 1.11 Rural imbalances confronting the ANC Government 2 ANC land policy 1990–2005: A critique 2.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 2.2 The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program 2.3 The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program 2.4 All LRAD eggs in one basket? 3 2019 Government-appointed panel on land reform: A critique 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Land is not a commodity 3.3 Land reform has not worked 3.4 An anachronistic model 3.5 African communalism: In a new presence? 3.6 Private ownership: A basic value also into the future 3.7 Life unfolds locally 3.8 Municipal organization 3.9 Democracy at all levels 3.10 People are subjects 3.11 Panel conclusion 4 Powerful inherited structures 4.1 European mission stations 4.2 Myths 4.3 Communal land 4.4 Urban–rural relations 4.5 Land productivity 4.6 Bricolage 4.7 Subsistence production in capitalism 5 The ANC’s burden of state organization 5.1 Nationalisations 5.2 Land under chiefs 5.3 Varying views on land reform 5.4 The Landless People’s Movement 5.5 The ANC’s state organization dilemma 5.6 Struggles of state in ANC 5.7 Ben Cousins (PLAAS): Stages of land reform 1994–2016 5.8 Overall evaluation 5.9 Costs of land reform 5.10 The relevance of the South Africa case 6 The land state in the western region of South Africa 6.1 Land reform on the ground 6.2 Livelihood improvements 6.3 Study group (SG): The public land elite 6.4 The politicians 6.5 Party leadership 6.6 Structures in the land state 6.7 Agents 6.8 Politicians’ evaluations of the agricultural bureaucracy 6.9 Democracy in place: The legislatures are more divided on land reform than the bureaucracy 6.10 Obligations on land in the Department of Agriculture at Elsenburg 6.11 The new Elsenburg (1997): Miniscule but creative land reform within commercial agriculture 6.12 Weak support for reorientation 7 The power of a transformed bureaucracy in land reform: Professionalism in the public sector 7.1 Democratisation of the land administration 7.2 Administration of water 7.3 The Water Research Commission 7.4 The development perspective of the Agricultural Research Council 7.5 The land and water management regimes 7.6 The land administration: Devalued and fragmented 7.7 The land state’s conceptions of state authority, markets and stakeholders in land 7.8 The land state: Competent, but poorly integrated and distrusting of stakeholders 8 Land reform in Paulshoek and Saron 8.1 Land politics in Paulshoek 8.2 Public management in Namaqualand 8.3 Saron: Survival and commercial pressure on land 8.4 The Del Monte fruit company 9 Conclusion: The barriers to land reform in the state: Lack of municipal democracy and administrative competence 9.1 Findings 9.2 The welfare state 9.3 Emerging black farmers 9.4 The ANC as a rational actor: Making good on its obligations 10 References African Minds 01 African Minds 04 01 20240930 02 WORLD 06 15 9781928502869 06 15 9781928502876 06 15 9781928502883 WORLD 09 African Minds 20 01