Thoth distribution@thoth.pub 20260429T055611

urn:uuid:057a6d56-a7ef-4d6f-9c19-fe8a4930629c 03 01 01 urn:uuid:057a6d56-a7ef-4d6f-9c19-fe8a4930629c 15 9781805110927 06 10.11647/OBP.0359 00 EB E107 10 Creative Commons License 02 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 01 01 Insolubles Critical Edition with English Translation 1 A01 Walter Segrave 2 B01 Barbara Bartocci 3 B01 Stephen Read 01 eng 00 158 03 04 BC21.I64 12 HBLC1 10 HIS010000 20 Medieval Paradoxes 93 NHD B2 Philosophy B2 European Studies: English and Irish Studies 10 HIS037010 12 HPC 20 Liar Paradox 93 NHDJ 12 HPCB 10 PHI012000 93 QDHF 20 Restrictivism 20 Supposition Theory 20 Thomas Bradwardine 20 Fallacy of Accident 03 00 Paradoxes, such as the Liar (‘What I am saying is false’), fascinated medieval thinkers. What I said can’t be true, for if it were, it would be false. So it must be false—but then it would be true after all. Attempts at a solution to this contradiction led such thinkers to develop their theories of meaning, reference and truth. A popular response, until it was attacked at length by Thomas Bradwardine in the early 1320s, was to dismiss such self-reference as impossible: no term (here, ‘false’) could refer to (or in medieval terms, “supposit for”) a whole, e.g., a proposition, of which it is part. In light of Bradwardine’s criticisms, Walter Segrave, writing around 1330, defended so-called restrictivism (restrictio) by claiming that such paradoxes exhibited a fallacy of accident. The classic example of this fallacy, the first of Aristotle’s fallacies independent of language, is the Hidden Man puzzle: you know Coriscus, Coriscus is the one approaching, but you don’t know the one approaching since, e.g., he is wearing a mask. But Aristotle’s account is unclear and Segrave, building on ideas of Giles of Rome and Walter Burley, shows how the fallacy turns on an equivocation over the supposition of the middle term or one of the extremes in a syllogism. Thereby, Segrave is able to counter Bradwardine’s arguments one by one and defend the restrictivist solution. In this volume, Segrave’s text is edited from the three extant manuscripts, is translated into English, and is preceded by a substantial Introduction. 04 00 Preface Introduction Conspectus Signorum Gualteri Segrave Insolubilia Capitulum Primum: De diffinitione insolubilium Capitulum Secundum: Solventes secundum peccatum in materia Capitulum Tertium: Solventes secundum peccatum in forma Capitulum Quartum: Solutio auctoris Capitulum Quintum: Obiectiones contra positionem auctoris et responsiones eiusdem Capitulum Sextum: Solutio insolubilium cathegoricorum et ypotheticorum Capitulum Septimum: De apparentibus insolubilibus Bibliography Walter Segrave, Insolubles Chapter 1: Definition of insolubles Chapter 2: Solutions according to errors in matter Chapter 3: Solutions according to defects in form Chapter 4: The author's solution Chapter 5: Objections to the author's solution and his replies Chapter 6: Solutions to subject-predicate and compound insolubles Chapter 7: On merely apparent insolubles 20 00 Open Access Open Book Publishers 01 Open Book Publishers Cambridge, UK 04 01 20241017 13 15 9781805110910 09 Open Book Publishers 29 Publisher's website: download the title https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0359.pdf 99 01 09 Open Book Publishers 02 Publisher's website: web shop https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0359 99 01