Thoth distribution@thoth.pub 20260519T175825

urn:uuid:808410c2-da6d-4952-9229-663081c4d612 03 01 01 urn:uuid:808410c2-da6d-4952-9229-663081c4d612 15 9781805117087 06 10.11647/OBP.0490 00 EB E107 10 Creative Commons License 02 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 01 01 Models in Political Economy Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion 1 A01 21 0000-0001-8584-6176 Martin J. Osborne 01 eng 00 552 03 B2 Economics 04 JA72 93 JPQB 10 POL023000 20 Political economy 20 Formal models 93 JPHV 10 POL016000 B2 Politics and Sociology 20 Game theory 93 JPH 10 POL024000 B2 Textbooks and Learning Guides 20 Collective choice 93 KCA 10 POL003000 93 GPQ 10 SOC024000 20 Voting theory 20 Electoral competition 10 MAT011000 03 00 This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding.Part I presents models of collective choice. The main question is whether methods exist for selecting a reasonable compromise when individuals’ preferences differ. Models of voting are studied in Part II. Included are models in which the individuals differ in their preferences as well as ones in which they differ in their information. One chapter considers the implications of individuals having ethical concerns, and another studies a model of sequential voting. Models of electoral competition, under the assumption of various motivations for the candidates, are discussed in Part III. One chapter is devoted to the application of these models to the study of redistributive policy. The book concludes with Part IV, which covers models of bargaining and rebellion.The book offers a rigorous yet accessible foundation for understanding how formal tools can illuminate political phenomena. 04 00 Preface Part I Collective choice 1 Collective choice with known preferences 1.1 Collective choice rules 1.2 Anonymity and neutrality 1.3 Two alternatives: majority rule 1.4 Three or more alternatives: Condorcet winners 1.5 Two domains with Condorcet winners 1.6 Condorcet winners for two-dimensional sets of alternatives 1.7 Preference aggregation: Arrow’s theorem 1.8 Preference intensities and interpersonal comparisons Notes Solutions to exercises 2 Collective choice with privately-known preferences 2.1 Strategy-proofness of strict Condorcet winner 2.2 Strategy-proofness for domain of all preference profiles 2.3 General mechanisms Notes Solutions to exercises Part II Voting 3 Voting with two alternatives 3.1 Voting as a strategic game 3.2 Costly voting with uncertainty about cost 3.3 The incentive to vote in a large population 3.4 Preferences with regret Notes Solutions to exercises 4 Voting with many alternatives: plurality rule 4.1 Plurality rule voting games 4.2 Spatial model with concave payoff functions 4.3 Strategic and sincere voting: divided majority Notes Solutions to exercises 5 Sequential pairwise voting 5.1 Binary agendas 5.2 Successive agendas 5.3 Amendment agendas 5.4 Agenda formation 5.5 Optimistically sincere strategies, single-peaked preferences, convex agendas Notes Solutions to exercises 6 Ethical voting and expressive voting 6.1 Ethical voting 6.2 Expressive voting Notes 7 Voting with asymmetric information 7.1 Strategic abstention 7.2 Unanimity rule 7.3 Majority rule with diverse preferences: an example Notes Solutions to exercises Part III Electoral competition 8 Electoral competition: two office-motivated candidates 8.1 General model 8.2 Spatial model 8.3 Candidates uncertain of citizens’ preferences 8.4 Costly voting 8.5 Citizens with preferences over candidates 8.6 Electing a legislature 8.7 Interpreting Nash equilibrium Notes Solutions to exercises 9 Electoral competition: two policy-motivated candidates 9.1 Basic model 9.2 Uncertain median 9.3 Candidates privately informed about policies 9.4 Repeated elections Notes Solutions to exercises 10 Electoral competition: endogenous candidates 10.1 Simultaneous entry with sincere voting 10.2 Simultaneous entry with strategic voting 10.3 Sequential entry 10.4 Citizen-candidates Notes Solutions to exercises 11 Distributive politics 11.1 Two-candidate competition with exogenous incomes under uncertainty 11.2 Voting over transfer systems when income is endogenous 11.3 Voting over linear transfer systems 11.4 Coalitional bargaining over redistribution Notes Solutions to exercises 12 Money in electoral competition 12.1 Mobilizing citizens to vote 12.2 Informing citizens of candidates’ qualities Notes Solutions to exercises 13 Two-period electoral competition with imperfect information 13.1 Selecting and controlling incumbents with unknown preferences 13.2 Inducing an incumbent to exert effort 13.3 Candidates who pander to voters Notes Part IV Exercising power 14 Bargaining 14.1 Bargaining game with voting 14.2 Recurrent distributive bargaining game with voting Notes Solutions to exercises 15 Rulers threatened by rebellion 15.1 Threat of revolt 15.2 Coordinating rebellion Notes Solutions to exercises Part V Appendix 16 Preferences, profiles, games, and optimization 16.1 Preferences and payoffs 16.2 Sets of individuals and profiles 16.3 Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem 16.4 Strategic games 16.5 Bayesian games 16.6 Extensive games 16.7 Coalitional games 16.8 Optimization References Index 20 00 Open Access Open Book Publishers 01 Open Book Publishers Cambridge, UK 04 01 20250912 13 15 9781805117070 09 Open Book Publishers 02 Publisher's website: web shop https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0490 99 01 09 Open Book Publishers 29 Publisher's website: download the title https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0490.pdf 99 01