Thoth distribution@thoth.pub 20260519T131116

urn:uuid:38d50ad2-8e74-48be-be21-92335d73fdc0 03 01 01 urn:uuid:38d50ad2-8e74-48be-be21-92335d73fdc0 15 9781911712022 06 10.31389/lsepress.spa 00 EB E107 10 Creative Commons License 02 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 01 01 Spectrum Auctions Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy 1 A01 21 0000-0002-0764-6192 Geoffrey Myers First edition. 01 eng 00 314 03 10 BUS079000 B2 Economics 04 HE 12 JPP 93 JPP B2 Public policy 10 TEC071000 93 TJK 12 TJK 93 KNTX 12 KNTX 10 TEC034000 01 06 03 00 <p>Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures.</p><p>Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.</p> 04 00 1. Preface 2. Introducing spectrum auctions 3. Understanding the radio spectrum, auctions, and the UK case 4. Market design, economic efficiency, and game theory for spectrum auctions 5. Regulation, public value, and policymaking 6. Applying expertise in decision-making processes 7. Laying foundations before the auction 8. Auction design objectives and baseline decisions 9. Choosing an auction format 10. Promoting downstream competition 11. Harnessing auctions for better-informed public policy decisions 12. Auction bidding and outcomes 13. Afterword: Reflections for future auctions 14. Annex A: Further details of the UK’s spectrum auctions, 2000–21 15. Annex B: Further explanation of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) format and bidding in the UK’s 2013 auction 16. Annex C: Additional explanation of the cost-benefit role of auctions 20 00 Open Access LSE Press 01 LSE Press UK: London 04 01 20230215 2023 06 15 9781911712022 06 15 9781911712022 06 15 9781911712046 06 15 9781911712053 09 LSE Press 29 Publisher's website: download the title https://books.press.lse.ac.uk/10.31389/lsepress.spa.pdf 99 01 09 LSE Press 02 Publisher's website: web shop https://press.lse.ac.uk/books/m/10.31389/lsepress.spa 99 01